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Abstract 
This paper examines the influence of firm performance and internal governance mechanisms on CEO turnover decision. 
The sample of the study is all Nigerian non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from year 
2011 to 2015 consisting of 72 cases of CEO turnover. Using logistic regression analysis, this study provides evidences 
that poor accounting-based performance (ROA) and low engagement of female directors in corporate boards do 
increase the probability of CEO turnover. Furthermore, firms dominated with foreign ownership and those with 
independent board nominating committee are swifter in removing their CEOs. However, this study fails to support the 
argument that firms with large board size and those that are dominated by managerial ownership, help to enhance the 
monitoring practices, which ought to sanction underperformed CEOs with dismissal. Consequently, this study 
recommends that the Nigerian government should enact a legislation on gender quota to ensure that more female 
directors are appointed to the boards and as well encourage more foreign ownership in the Nigerian corporate landscape 
by attracting foreign investment into the economy via favourable policies. This paper contributes to the literature 
concerning CEO succession in developing markets with poor corporate governance structure such as Nigeria. 
Keywords: CEO turnover, firm performance, foreign ownership, governance mechanism, Nigeria  
1. Introduction  
Turnover in a general term refers to the rate at which workers leave their workplace or industry. It is about the rate at 
which employees are being fired or replaced by their employer within a given period. While in the case of the employee 
turnover, the turnover could be as a result of dissatisfaction with the management, job role, wages, or possibility of 
better pay elsewhere or job security, career advancement or dismissal or termination. However, the CEO turnover is 
largely due to performance decline. It could be accounting performance or market-based performance. CEO turnover 
serves as an incentive to the CEOs to implement proper strategies and manage the firms efficiently and effectively to 
increase the shareholders’ wealth and enhance the performance of the firms to avoid being fired by the shareholders 
(principal) (Dikolli, Mayew, & Nanda, 2014).  
While the board is primarily concerned with increasing shareholders’ wealth by improving stock price, the CEOs as 
argued are concerned with self-interest and maximising their personal wealth and other non-pecuniary benefits (Puffer 
& Weintrop, 2015). In order to ensure that the CEOs’ interests align with the shareholders’ interests, CEO dismissal 
becomes a key controlling mechanism in that regards. For the board of directors to execute this decisive action, they 
normally depend on the firm performance as a reliable yardstick in assessing the ability and effectiveness of the CEOs 
(Abdullahi, Ishak & Sawandi, 2018).  
Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms have been established by previous empirical findings to have significant 
influence on the CEO turnover (Ronghai & Hailin, 2006). There are two broad categories of corporate governance 
mechanisms that influence CEO turnover, namely, board structure, and ownership structure. Irrespective of the nature and 
size of the economy, each element of the corporate governance mechanisms affects the CEO turnover in a specific way, 
however, not much attention has been paid to it by either the economic theory or company laws across the countries 
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(Baysinger & Butler, 2014). Consequently, this study examines the influence of board attributes and ownership 
characteristics on CEO turnover. The rest of the paper is presented as follow; section 2.0 literature review and 
hypotheses development, section three is the methodology, while section four is data analysis, interpretation and 
discussion; while conclusion and recommendations is contained in section five. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
2.1 Firm Performance and CEO Turnover 
In view of the significance and importance of the nature of the responsibility of the CEO in a corporation, several 
studies had concentrated on the CEO turnover and firm performance relationship (Cook, 2015; Fiordelisi & Ricci, 
2013). Although, most of the prior studies found negative associations between firm performance and CEO turnover, 
there have been remarkable divergent results on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance across the countries. 
Whilst the studies from the UK and US reported that current performance affected CEO turnover, most of the studies in 
the developing markets established that poor performance had a lagged effect on CEO turnover (Conyon & He, 2014; 
Ishak & Abdul Latif, 2013; Ishak, 2010; Sanda, Mikailu, & Garba, 2010).  
While several prior studies have reported negative relationship between corporate performance and CEO turnover 
(Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Ishak et al., 2012; Puffer & Weintrop, 2015; Abdullahi, Ishak & Sawandi, 2017), there 
have been inconsistencies in the findings of the previous studies on the relationship between performance and CEO 
turnover. These inconsistences have been claimed to be due to insufficient attention being paid to the nature of the 
performance indicator adopted by the board of directors in making the turnover decision (Puffer & Weintrop, 2015). 
They further suggested that the sensitivity of firm performance will be higher when the performance measures used 
reflect the expectations of the shareholders.  
Furthermore, Puffer and Weintrop (2015) in the study of a sample of 408 CEOs in US corporations, found that the 
actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) and analysts’ expectations were both strongly sensitive to CEO turnover and not 
accounting ratios. On the other hand, while utilising a sample of 809 CEOs from the Fortune Global 500 firms, Choi 
(2015) observed that the accounting performance of the firms remained the major driver of the forced CEO turnover. He 
found that the forced turnover reduced significantly as the firms’ accounting performance improved but there was no 
significant effect from the stock performance. This indicates that the board of directors of firms is more likely to dismiss 
underperforming CEOs relying on accounting performance and not stock performance in taking the turnover decision. 
Therefore, this study hypothesizes that:  
H1 turnover: Firms are more likely to change their CEOs in the events of poor performance.  
2.2 Board Structure and CEO Turnover 
The board of directors is an integral part of the governance structure of corporations. However, Baysinger and Butler 
(2014) argue that the economic theory and company laws across the countries have not paid adequate attention to these 
issues. Hence, this study considers variables such as; board size, board members’ gender diversity and nominating 
committee independence in the context of an emerging and developing economy to deepen the understanding of the 
influence of these variables on CEO succession. 
2.2.1 Board Size 
Board size is defined as the total number of members of a firm’s board of directors. In other words it is the total number 
of both the executive and non-executive directors of a firm (Combs et al., 2007; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Mobbs, 
2013; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Sanda et al., 2010; You & Du, 2012). Board size is suggested to have influence on the 
relationship between CEO turnover in a firm. However, a large board size has an adverse effect on the quality of the 
monitoring of the board, as the smaller boards are more likely to replace a poorly performing CEO (Bekiris, 2013; Cook, 
2015; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012). Furthermore, Bekiris (2013) argues that a smaller board size enhances the ability 
of the board to monitor the CEO, hence, more likely to replace the underperforming CEO. Similarly, Dikolli, Mayew, 
and Nanda (2014) opine that smaller boards lead to higher monitoring. Indicating that, the smaller the board size the 
higher the probability of CEO turnover (Dikolli et al., 2014b; You & Du, 2012). A large board size is reported to have a 
negative impact on firm performance (Ujunwa, 2012). In fact, the NCCG recommended a minimum of five members on 
the board of listed companies in the stock exchange but did not stipulate the maximum number of members (Abdullahi, 
Ishak & Sawandi, 2018). Hence, the next hypothesis posited that: 
H2 turnover: Firms with larger board size are more likely to change their CEOs. 
2.2.2 Board Member Gender Diversity 
Gender diversity or female representation on the companies’ board of directors have become a central focus point in the 
corporate governance discussions and studies globally, with several companies being enjoined to appoint females to 
their boards. The importance of board diversity is essentially noticeable and relevant if only it enhances the 
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effectiveness of the boards and, consequently, the firms’ performance. Otherwise, it will be regarded as a mere tokenism 
(Abdullah & Ku Ismail, 2013).  
Although, several research works across the globe have shown that corporate performance is enhanced by board 
diversity, yet it has remained to a great extent an alien concept in the majority of the boardrooms worldwide (Diplock, 
Wilderotter, & Kilaas, 2011). For example, Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy (2014) reported that Norway in 2004, adopted a 
compulsory quota law on gender, requiring 40 percent of the board positions for all the listed companies to be allocated 
to women. This initiative inspired many countries across Europe to follow suit in the appointment of women as 
directors, such as Finland in 2005, Spain in 2007 and Belgium in 2011. Similarly, in the other regions, several countries 
like Australia in 2009, adopted it, followed by Malaysia in 2011, Hong Kong and New Zealand both in 2012 and several 
others revised their corporate governance codes to accommodate this initiative. However, the Nigerian corporate 
governance codes were revised in 2011, it remains silent on the quota law for the boardroom gender diversity.  
In line with the agency theory, the monitoring role of the board of directors serves as an extremely important 
mechanism for mitigating the conflicts between the principal and the agent, which ultimately affect corporate 
performance. Recent studies suggest that greater boardroom gender diversity can strengthen the monitoring function. 
For instance, Adams, Nowland, and Grey (2011) observed that female directors appeared to have a superior monitoring 
ability and are also able to think more independently, and they are not influenced by the usual male-dominated 
syndrome. Furthermore, greater board gender diversity can also improve better monitoring because female director 
representation can enhance managerial accountability, and CEO responsibility. Consequently, female directors can act 
as additional independent directors that can help in improving the monitoring role of the board of directors (Nguyen et 
al., 2014 and Adams, Nowland, & Grey, 2011).  
Although, most of the studies on board gender diversity were carried out in the developed economies, the empirical 
findings were mixed or inconclusive. While some researchers found that there is a positive relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance (Dezsö & Ross, 2012), some others reported a negative relationship (Ujunwa 2012; 
Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). In fact, others documented that there was no evidence of any significant relationship (Carter, 
D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). Consequent upon this mixed empirical evidence, Nguyen et.al, (2014) suggested 
that the differences in the research contexts and the econometric methods used were responsible for the mixed findings. 
Furthermore, Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2013) study board diversity in 100 top non-financial firms in Malaysia, using the 
2007 annual reports of the companies , their multivariate analyses indicated a lack of diversity, specifically, the authors 
found a negative association between gender diversity and firm performance using the ROA and Tobin’s Q. From the 
aforementioned studies, gender diversity has not been studied in the context of CEO turnover, therefore, this study has 
strived to ascertain that board gender diversity affects the CEO succession in public listed companies. As the 
involvement of females on the board increases the performance of the company through enhanced and effective 
monitoring, it is expected that turnover is less likely to occur. Thus, this study hypothesises that: 
H3 turnover: Firms with high proportion of female board members are less likely to change their CEOs. 
2.2.3 Board Nominating Committee Independence  
Most corporate boards as observed by Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) carry out their oversight responsibility in 
committees, however, the extent of the influence of these board committees on the effectiveness of the overall board 
monitoring is unclear (Guo & Masulis, 2015). The board nominating committee is one of the most important 
committees through which the corporate boards perform one of their most crucial tasks (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015). Thus, 
Guo and Masulis (2015) argued that the board nominating committee is very important in determining the effectiveness 
and quality of the CEO’s monitoring and supervision, as well as the nomination of new directors for election at the 
annual general meetings. Therefore, the composition of this committee will affect not just the entire board, but the true 
independence of the directors which will consequently affect the quality of the oversight function of the board. 
The composition of board committees is very vital to the effectiveness of the board in its monitoring of the CEO 
(Abdullahi, Ishak & Sawandi, 2018). Hence, the composition of the nominating committee is crucial to the effectiveness 
of the board, especially where the CEOs are not members of the nominating committees Similarly, Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) argue that powerful CEOs are likely to nominate or influence the nomination of directors into the 
nominating committee. This scenario is capable of leading to CEO entrenchment which can ultimately lead to the CEOs 
influencing the turnover decision. The authors further stressed in their findings that, the absence of a nominating 
committee or the presence of the CEO in the nominating committee and fewer independent directors being appointed to 
the nominating committee can allow the CEOs to have control over the board hence, CEOs are not likely to be 
dismissed even in the event of poor performance. Therefore, this study has put forward the following hypothesis: 
H4 selection: Firms with a high proportion of outsiders on the board nominating committee are more likely to 
replace their CEOs. 
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2.3 Foreign Ownership and CEO Turnover 
The Nigerian corporate environment is characterised by concentrated shareholding mostly by family and foreign 
ownerships (Adegbite, Amaeshi, & Nakajima, 2013; Sanda, Mikailu & Garba, 2010). The concentration of ownership 
by family and foreign ownership in Nigeria has been due to the liberalization of the economy embarked upon by the 
federal government through the promulgation of the legislations which removed all obstacles on the free flow of capital 
from abroad into the economy (Tsegba & Herbert, 2013; Tsegba et al., 2014). Hence, this paper attempts to investigate 
the influence of foreign ownership and managerial ownership being the dominant shareholder in the Nigerian PLCs on 
the CEO turnover. 
Foreign ownership brings about enhanced firm performance due to the competition it engenders in the corporate market, 
as such, it is a crucial aspect of corporate governance mechanisms. Foreign ownership is perceived to have a more 
informed board and well experienced management with commensurate training and expertise that distinguishes such 
firm from the local counterparts, hence, it has better performance. Foreign ownership is simply the percentage of shares 
owned by foreign individuals (Tsegba, Herbert, & Ene, 2014).  
Similarly, Munisi, Hermes and Randøy, (2014) examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm structure 
for listed firms of twelve Sub- Saharan African countries. The study utilises data covering the period of 2006 to 2009. 
The result shows that foreign ownership was negatively related to the board size. Suggesting that firms with foreign 
ownership are characterised by small board size, which enhances the effectiveness of the board in monitoring and, 
hence, increases the probability of CEO turnover. In addition, foreign ownership strengthens board independence which 
in turn, improves the monitoring ability of the firms, thereby increasing the CEO turnover sensitivity (Boivie et al., 
2016). Foreign ownership firms are more effective in monitoring and upholding better corporate governance practices. 
Hence, the firms are inclined to replace underperforming CEOs (He, Rui, Zheng, & Zhu, 2014). 
However, several studies have considered foreign ownership in various aspects of corporate governance and corporate 
performance (Ezeoha, & Okafor, 2012; He et al., 2014; Tsegba et al., 2014). But few studies had examined the 
relationship between the foreign ownership and the CEO turnover to the best of the researcher’s knowledge. Therefore, 
owing to the enhanced and effective monitoring feature of foreign ownership, it is expected to influence the CEO 
turnover especially in Nigeria as the foreign ownership constitutes a significant proportion of its corporate ownership 
composition. Moreover, it is equally expected that foreign ownership will be more sensitive to CEO turnover regarding 
its performance relationship. This study, therefore, hypothesises thus: 
H5 turnover: Firms with high proportion of foreign ownership are more likely to change their CEOs. 
2.4 Managerial Ownership and CEO Turnover 
Managerial ownership otherwise referred to as insider ownership or director shareholding is the total shares held by 
members of the board of directors of the company (Tsegba et al., 2014). Managerial ownership reduces agency costs as 
it aligns the managerial interests with that of the shareholders, however, higher ownership by the mangers could lead to 
the entrenchment of the management which will ultimately affect firm performance and weaken the governance 
mechanisms of the corporation (Tsegba et al., 2014).  
Similarly, Hornstein (2013) find that, the higher the managerial ownership level in a firm, the lower the probability of 
CEO turnover. Ruan and Tian (2011) argue that for Chinese listed firms, at lower level of managerial ownership (below 
18 per cent), the CEOs’ behaviours were controlled and influenced by the board’s disciplinary measures, hence, the 
CEOs were effectively monitored and less likely to be removed due to improved firm performance. However, at a high 
degree of managerial ownership, managers’ interests were aligned with those of the shareholders, hence it reduces CEO 
turnover (Ruan & Tian, 2011). This study, has therefore, suggested the following hypothesis: 
H6 turnover: Firms with a high proportion of managerial ownership are less likely to change their CEOs. 
2.5 Control Variables 
To avoid biased and outrageous results, and to boost or strengthen the confidence in the analysis, some variables were 
termed and used as controls. Which means, control variables are those variables that can significantly offer different 
explanations to the results if left out of the model (Combs et al., 2007). These are variables that have been regularly 
established by the previous studies as relating to CEO turnover, corporate governance mechanisms and corporate 
performance. For this study, the following control variables were used; firm size, leverage and firm age. 
3. Methodology  
The main theory for this study is agency theory, which about the separation of ownership from the management of the 
corporation. This separation creates agency cost or problem between the managers and the owners of the firms. The 
agency theory is the most adopted theoretical framework in most of the previous academic literature in the field of 
corporate governance. This is because, it tends to dominate the recommendations on board best practices in the various 
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codes of corporate governance (Mallin, Melis, & Gaia, 2014). The modeling of the relationship between the owners and 
the managers to such that exists between the principal and the agent and is a key feature of Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
The methodology that was used in this study is based on secondary data and is longitudinal, sourced from the audited 
annual reports of the public listed companies in Nigeria and corporate announcements from the website of the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE). The population of this study is all of the listed non-financial companies on the NSE during the 
period of 2011 to 2015. The year 2011 was considered in order to capture the effect of the review of the NCCG 2011; 
and 2015 was the latest year for which the data could be captured. Furthermore, 2010 was used as the base year to find 
the CEO turnover in the first year of the study. The total of all of the listed companies was 221 based on NSE Fact book 
2010/2012. Table 1 shows the list of listed firms in Nigeria.   
 
Table 1. Sector by Sector Number of Listed Firms by NSE  
S/N Sectors NSE Quoted 
1. Agriculture             5 
2. Alternative Securities Markets (ASeM) 10 
3. Conglomerates 6 
4. Construction/Real Estate 10 
5. Consumer Goods 27 
6. Financial Services 56 
7. Healthcare 10 
8. Industrial Goods 28 
9. Information, Communications & Telecoms 11 
10. Mandatory Quotations 22 
11. Natural Resources 6 
12. Oil & Gas 10 
13. Services 20 
Grand Total  221 
Source: NSE Factbook 2010/2011. 
 
There were about 13 sectors/industries listed in the Nigerian economy as of the 2010/2011 financial year. These could 
be broadly divided into financial and nonfinancial industries. While the financial services industries had the highest 
number of listed firms (56), the agricultural sector had the least (5). On average, there were about 17 firms in each of 
the 13 industries that constituted the economy that formed the total of 221 firms.  
The dependent variable of this research is CEO turnover. Identifying CEO turnover involves two stages. In the first 
stage the base year needed to be determined. The names of the CEOs for all 221 listed companies based on the NSE 
factbook 2010 /2011 were gathered. However, due to specific regulation of the financial sector, the sector comprising 56 
companies was excluded from the population. The final sample of this study was 165 companies. Companies listed in 
2015 were excluded from the list. CEO turnover was measured using a dummy, ―1‖ for turnover and ―0‖ for no turnover. 
The next step was to compare the names of the CEOs in the base year (2010) to the names of CEOs in 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014 and 2015 changes in the names of CEOs were considered CEO turnovers. These changes in the names of the 
CEOs were then compared with announcements made by the ―company under the section of corporate disclosure/ issuer 
announcements ‖ in the NSE (Ishak, 2010; Abdullahi, Ishak & Sawandi, 2018). The main reason of making such a 
comparison was to verify the CEO changes. 
Logistic regression was used to analyse the CEO turnover. Pallant (2007) observed that logistic regression is an 
analytical tool used in simultaneously investigating the effects of several independent variables on a single dependent 
variable. This is an appropriate statistical technique when the dependent variable is nominal and a binary. Based on the 
discussions, the following CEO turnover model was formulated for this study: 
CEOTURNOVER=β0+β1PERFMit+β2BSIZEit+β3BNCIDit+β4BGNDRit+β5FROWNit+β6MGOWNit+β7FSIZEit+β8LEVRGEit
+β9FAGEit+ ɛit                                                                                         (1) 
Where: 
CEOTURNOnCEOTURNOVER CEO turnover 
PERFM Return on assets and Tobin’s Q                                 
BSIZE  Board size 
BNCID Board nominating committee independence  
BGNDR Board member gender diversity 
FROWN Foreign ownership 
MGOWN Managerial ownership 
FSIZE Firm size 
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FAGE Firm age 
LEVRGE Leverage 
3.2 Measurement of the Independent Variables   
Corporate performance was represented by the ROA. Board structure was represented by the attributes of board size, 
board nominating committee independence and board gender diversity. Ownership characteristic was made up of the 
foreign ownership and managerial ownership. There were also three control variables used for the research and they 
include firm size, leverage and firm age. Table 2 contains the details of the measurement. 
 
Table 2. Measurement of Research Variables and Main Sources of Data  
S/N Label Descriptive Measurement Main Sources Reference 
1 CEOTURNOVER Dummies: 1 = Turnover; 0 = No turnover  Annual report Rachpradit et al.( 2012); Ishak et al. (2010) 
2 
PERFM 
ROA is profit before interest & tax / Book 
value of total assets  
Data stream Ishak et al. (2012) 
 
 
Tobin’s Q is measured as market value of 
equity + debt capital / Book value of total 
asset.  
Data stream  
(Abdullah, 2014; Zhang, Wierschem, & 
Mediavilla, 2016). 
3 BSIZE Total number of board members  Annual Reports  Rachpradit et al. ( 2012) 
4 
BNCID 
Proportion of non-executive members in the 
nominating committee  
Annual Reports Guo and Masulis (2015) and Ishak (2010). 
5 BGNDR Proportion of female directors on the board Annual Reports Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2013) 
6 
FROWN 
The percentage of shares directly or indirectly 
owned by foreigners to the total shares in the 
company. 
Annual Reports  Tsegba et al. (2014)  
7 
MGOWN 
The percentage of shares directly or indirectly 
owned by executive directors other than CEO 
to the total shares in the company 
Annual Reports  Ishak (2010) Tsegba et al. (2014) 
8 FSIZE Natural log of the book value of total assets  Data Stream Ishak et al. (2012) 
9 LEVRGE Total debt / book value of total assets  Data Stream Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012) 
10 FAGE Number of the years of existence of the firm Annual Reports Xie (2014) 
 
4. Analysis and Discussion 
A total of 72 CEO turnover events were recorded across the companies within the non-financial sector. A matching 
methodology was adopted to match the 72 turnover companies with 72 non-turnover companies in order to estimate the 
regression model for the CEO turnover. There are two main methods usually adopted by researchers, for example, 
Abidin (2006); Fan et al., (2007) and Ishak (2010), to compare between turnover and non-turnover companies. These 
are the (i) selection of all companies that have not changed the CEOs and (ii) taking a sub-sample of the companies that 
have not changed their CEOs based on certain criteria that matched with the turnover companies, such as, size of the 
assets, year, and industry. However, due to the peculiarities of the sample of this study, the matching companies were 
selected based on asset size using a 50 percent upper and lower limit, which is consistent with previous researchers like 
Ishak (2010) and Abdullahi, Ishak and Sawandi (2017). 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics; for the six independent variables considered in this study. The ROA for the 
accounting-based performance was used as a proxy for corporate performance. The mean for the ROA for the full sample 
was 0.027 and that of the matching companies was 0.049, both were higher than that of the turnover firms which was very 
low at 0.004. However, there was no significant difference between the medians of all the categories. The minimum value 
of the ROA for the full sample was -0.933 and 0.388 was the maximum value of the ROA. The mean of Tobin’s Q for the 
turnover firms was 2.230 which was 21% and 41% higher than the mean for the full sample and the matching firms 
respectively. While the minimum and maximum value were 0.022 and 47.953 respectively for the full sample.  
The mean of the board size for all the categories of the firms was nine members on the board. The maximum number of 
members was seventeen while the minimum number of members on the board was four. This result is consistent with 
the finding of Sanda et al. (2010), which reported an optimal board size of ten. Meanwhile, the mean of board members’ 
gender was 10.8%, the minimum was 0% and the maximum was 80% for the full sample, while for the turnover 
companies it was 8.3% and for the matching firms it was a bit higher at 13.4%. Overall, this result indicates a low 
representation of female directors on the board.  
The mean of foreign ownership was 30.8% for the turnover companies which was higher than that of matching firms at 
23.9% and the full sample was 27’% and the minimum and maximum were 0% and 91% respectively. This result 
suggests that firms with foreign shareholders were more likely to change their CEOs. As for managerial ownership, the 
Applied Finance and Accounting                                          Vol. 6, No. 1; 2020 
72 
minimum and maximum were 0% and 85% for the full sample. There was no much difference in the means of the 
turnover sample at 10.9%, full sample at 11.9% and 12.9% for the matching companies.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
0.127 0.004 0.035 0.151 0.049 0.041 0.094 
4.075 2.230 1.156 5.638 1.307 0.990 1.110 
2.421 8.778 9.000 2.369 8.625 8.000 2.486 
0.409 0.670 0.750 0.400 0.513 0.667 0.408 
0.131 0.083 0.038 0.100 0.134 0.111 0.153 
29.306 30.808 23.870 29.631 23.920 9.705 28.771 
19.633 10.916 0.930 19.192 12.975 2.590 20.146 
123 70.1 3.700 164 28.100 8.803 50.700 
 1.754 16.537   16.429 1.881   16.057 15.991  1.594  
1.103 0.797 0.609 1.533 0.580 0.542 0.275 
19.837 40.208 42.500 18.826 39.597 38.500 20.926 
*** Significant at 1% level ** Significant at 5% level *Significant at 10% level ROA = Return on Asset, BSIZE = 
Board size, BNCID = Board nominating committee independence, BGNDR = Board member’s Gender, FROWN = 
Foreign ownership, MGOWN = Managerial ownership, FSIZE = Firm size, LFSIZE = Log of firm size, LEVRGE = 
Firm leverage, FAGE = Firm age. NOTE: FROWN and MGOWN are all in percentage. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
The Pearson product-moment correlation was adopted in this study to investigate the relationships between the variables, 
this is consistent with the suggestions of Pallant (2007). Thus, Table 4 displays the reports of the correlation between all 
the variables contained in this study. In line with the guidelines on interpretation by Pallant (2007), which suggests that 
a correlation above +/-0.50 was strong, +/-0.30 to +/-0.49 meant a moderate relation and +/-0.10 to +/-0.29 indicated a 
weak relationship. Table 4.3 presents the correlation results for all the variables of this study. The results were based on 
the full sample of 144 companies consisting of 72 companies for each of the turnover sample and the matching sample 
respectively.  
As displayed in Table 4, the dependent variable, CEO turnover was negatively correlated with the accounting 
performance as the coefficient of the correlation of the ROA was -0.18 and was statistically significant at 10%. 
Although, it was weakly correlated, this relationship implies that a decrease in the accounting performance of the firms 
increased the probability of CEO turnover. This is consistent with the previous studies like Conyon and He (2012); 
Fatima, Goergen and Mira (2013); and Lindrianasari and Hartono (2012). However, the correlation coefficient between 
leverage and Tobin’s Q was 0.934, and the relationship was statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. This 
was indicative of a very strong correlation which could lead to multicollinearity because it was more than the 90% 
threshold suggested by the scholars. To solve this problem, respecification of the variable, which is one of the remedies 
of multicollinearity was adopted as suggested by Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003). Thus, the log of Tobin’s Q was 
obtained which was, subsequently, used to obtain the correlation value of 0.47.  
Similarly, board member gender was negatively correlated with CEO turnover and the correlation coefficient was -0.19 
significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that a decrease in the number of female directors on the board increased 
the probability of CEO turnover. This situation might have been due to the declining of the firm performance due to the 
low presence of females on the board, because female directors are associated with good and efficient performance.  
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 






















        ROA -0.179* 1.000  
        TOBINSQ   1.000 
BSIZE 0.032 0.000 -0.028 1.000 
       BNCID 0.191   0.135 -0.097 0.199 1.000 
      BGNDR -0.194** 0.117 -0.066   0.119 -0.033 1.000 
     
FROWN 0.118 0.091 0.020 
0.166*
* -0.010 0.083 1.000 
    MGOWN -0.053 -0.047 -0.061 -0.121 0.083 0.046 -0.153* 1.000 
   






















FAGE 0.016 0.125 -0.028 -0.028 0.080 0.041 
0.345**
* -0.197** 0.074 -0.017 1.000 
NOTE: ***, * and * indicate that the parameter estimate was significant at level 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
4.3 Multicollinearity Test 
The collinearity diagnostic test was conducted to determine the existence of intercorrelation between the independent 
variables. Multicollinearity is deemed to exist if the tolerance level is less than 0.01 and the variance inflation factor is 
greater than 10 (Pallant, 2007). There was no multicollinearity existing among the variables in this study, as all the 
tolerance values were respectively greater than 0.01 and the VIF was less than 10 as displayed in Table 5. Tobin’s Q 
which has a very high VIF was remedied by respecification of the variable in line with the suggestion of Cohen et al. 
(2003). Consequently, the VIF for the new Tobin’s Q dropped from 8.21 to 1.51.  
 
Table 5. Multicollinearity Test: Tolerance Value and VIF 
Variables COLLINEARITY STATISTICS 
TOLERANCE VALUE VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR 
ROA 0.511 1.96 
TOBINSQ 0.122 8.21 
LTOBINSQ 0.667 1.51 
BSIZE 0.860 1.16 
BNCID 0.900 1.11 
BGNDR 0.951 1.05 
FROWN 0.900 1.11 
MGOWN 0.908 1.10 
FSIZE 0.900 1.11 
LEVRGE 0.535 1.87 
FAGE 0.823 1.21 
 
4.4 Firm Performance and CEO Turnover 
The study measured corporate performance using the accounting-based performance. The accounting measure was 
proxied by the ROA. This study hypothesised that poor corporate performance results in CEO turnover. Thus, it was 
expected that a significant negative relationship would exist between CEO turnover and firm performance. The result 
from the finding as indicated in Table 6 shows that firm performance proxied by the ROA was statistically and 
negatively associated with CEO turnover at the 5% level of significance. This finding indicates that the threat of 
turnover due to deficient performance is credible and that firm performance is normally used as a yardstick to measure 
the quality and success of the management. Hence, poor performance causes CEO turnover. When a CEO is performing 
poorly, the board dismisses the poorly performing CEO in line with the assumption of the agency theory which suggests 
that the threat of dismissal makes the CEOs align their interests with those of the shareholders. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of previous researchers like Rachpradit et al. (2012), Dikoli (2012) and Conyon and He 
(2012), which revealed that the likelihood of CEO turnover increases as the firm performance declines or decreases.  
Furthermore, the study revealed that the accounting-based performance (ROA) was significant as displayed in Table 6. 
This is supported by the previous empirical findings by Ishak and Abdul Latif (2013); Cook (2015) and Abdullahi et al. 
(2017) which reported negative relationship between corporate performance and CEO turnover using the accounting 
measure of performance rather than market-based performance because of its demerits, such as, the discount in stock 
price and illiquidity of the stock market, especially, the developing markets like Nigeria. Therefore, the finding of this 
study supported the hypothesis that, firms are more likely to change their CEOs in the event of poor performance. The 
CEOs are targeted for removal or dismissal because of the inference of the shareholders that the CEOs are not capable 
of creating wealth for the shareholders or improving the prospects and fortunes of the firms. 
Furthermore, accounting based performance such as return on assets (ROA) surpass market-based performance by 
revealing more information about the management’s actions than what Tobin’s Q alone does as contained in Table 7 
(Conyon & He, 2012). In addition, stock prices set in emerging markets may contain incomplete or inaccurate 
information about the top management’s performance (Lel & Miller, 2015; Rachpradit et al., 2012; Abdullahi et al., 
2018). These might be responsible for the insignificant p-value of 0.603. 
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Table 6. Logistic Regression  
CEO Turnover="1" Predicted sign Coefficient Standard Errors Z Statistic p- value 
ROA - -5.584 2.303 -2.42 0.015** 
BSIZE + -.074 0.086 -0.86 0.389 
BNCID + 1.348 0.492 2.74 0.006*** 
BGNDR - -4.189 1.778 -2.36 0.018 ** 
FROWN + 0.013 0.007 1.83 0.068* 
MGOWN - 0.000 0.010 0.03 0.972 
LFSIZE   5.700 2.730 2.09 0.037** 
LEVRGE   0-.077 0.465 -0.17 0.868 
FAGE   0-.006 0.010 -0.60 0.550 
Constant 0.146 0.904 0.16 0.872 
Chi-square   29.87*** (df=9)   
Pseudo R2    0.1496 
 
  
McFadden's R2   0.150 
 
  
Hosmer-Lemeshow   9.00 
 
  
Correctly classified: Overall  66.67%    
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level.  
 
In addition, Nigeria being a developing market, only the accounting-based performance was informative to the 
shareholders and was being relied upon to make the turnover decisions (Conyon & He, 2012; Rachpradit et al., 2012; 
Abdullahi et al., 2017). Table 7 is the result of the regression for the market-based performance (Tobin’s Q, the alternate 
proxy for the corporate performance considered in this study. Although, subsequent discussions focused on the ROA 
alone not Tobin’s Q. 
 
Table 7. Logistic Regression (with Tobin’s Q) 
CEO Turnover="1" Predicted sign Coefficient Standard Errors Z Statistic p- value 
LTOBINSQ  - 0-.150 0.289 -0.52 0.603 
BSIZE - 0-.053 .084 -0.63 0.526 
BNCID + 1.212 0.476 2.54 0.011** 
BGNDR - -4.234 1.718 -2.46 0.014** 
FROWN + 0.011 0.007 1.63 0.102 
MGOWN - 0.002 0.010 0.24 0.811 
LFSIZE 
 
4.900 2.700 1.82 0.068* 
LEVRGE 
 
0.550 0.688 0.80 0.424 
AGE 
 
-0.007 0.010 -0.71 0.476 
Constant 
 
0-.396 0.966 -0.41 0.681 
Chi-square   23.29*** (df=9) 
Pseudo R2              0.1166 
 McFadden's R2                  0.117 
 Hosmer-Lemeshow               10.21 
 Correctly classified: Overall  63.89%  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level 
 
4.5 Board Size and CEO Turnover 
The study hypothesised that, firms with a larger board size are more likely to replace their CEOs. However, the study 
did not support the postulation that a larger board size increases the probability of the CEO turnover. Although, the 
coefficient of board size was negative, as displayed in Table 6, it was not significant. Hence, a larger board size was not 
influential in determining the CEO turnover in the Nigerian firms. This finding from Nigeria gives credence to the 
popular conventional wisdom in corporate governance literature that smaller boards are better boards (Rachpradit et al., 
2012). This finding also agrees with the argument of Cook (2015) and Bekiris (2013) that a smaller board size enhances 
the ability of the board to monitor the CEO, hence, it is more likely to change the CEO. Moreover, a large board size 
has an adverse effect on the quality of the monitoring of the board (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012). Furthermore, the 
negative and insignificant coefficient could have been because, the Nigerian corporate landscape is characterized by 
essentially large board size as the mean of the board size as presented in Table 3 was nine and the maximum board size 
was 17. This is similar to the optimal board size of eight in the Malaysian corporate structure as reported by Ishak (2010) 
and 10 in China as documented by Conyon and He (2012). This large board size as in the case of Nigerian corporate 
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landscape has led to the free-rider effect which has weakened the effectiveness of the board. 
4.6 Board Nominating Committee Independence and CEO Turnover 
This study has predicted that firms with a high proportion of outsiders on the board nominating committee are more 
likely to change their new CEOs. The logistic regression as displayed in Table 6 did actually support the hypothesis as 
the coefficient is positively significant at 1% level. Hence, board nominating committee independence was influential in 
determining the decision to change the of CEOs as the performance declines. This result is consistent to the argument 
advanced by Masulis (2015) that for firms with a functional nominating committee in place and dominated by outsider 
board members are more inclined to discipline their CEOs via dismissal.  
4.7 Board Members’ Gender Diversity and CEO Turnover 
As anticipated, board members gender diversity showed a negative significant relationship with CEO turnover. The 
result of the regression shows that board members’ gender diversity was significant at the 5% level with a negative 
coefficient, indicating that the more female directors on the board of a firm the less the probability of CEO turnover. 
This finding supported the hypothesis which states that firms with a high proportion of female board members are less 
likely to replace their CEOs. The result of this study is in conformity and consistent with the previous empirical findings 
reported by researchers like Dezso and Ross (2012), Alves et al. (2015), Abdullahi et al. (2018) and Adams et al. (2009) 
that, gender diversity enhances the effectiveness of the board of directors and adds value to the company. It equally 
improves the performance of the firm (Ku Ismail & Abdul Manaf, 2016) which, in turn, reduces the probability of 
dismissing the CEO because, there will be no need for turnover as the firm’s performance is good and enhanced. 
4.8 Foreign Ownership and CEO Turnover 
The hypothesis proposes that foreign ownership enhances the effective monitoring of the CEO by the board and is 
inclined to replace the CEO in the event of declining performance. Thus, the study hypothesised that there would be a 
positive significant relationship between foreign ownership and CEO turnover. The hypothesis was supported as the 
p-value of foreign ownership from Table 6 was significant and the coefficient was positive at 10% significance level. 
This finding implies that foreign ownership does play a significant role in the dismissal of CEOs. This result confirms 
the previous position of other scholars like Boive et al. (2016) who reported that foreign ownership strengthens board 
independence which, in turn, improves the monitoring ability of the firms thereby increasing the CEO turnover 
sensitivity. This finding is similar to Ezeoha and Okafor (2013) which explain that foreign ownership brings about a 
better corporate governance and modern management practices to the firms and improves the performance.  
4.9 Managerial Ownership and CEO Turnover 
The hypothesis on managerial ownership to CEO turnover proposes that a higher level of managerial ownership leads to 
CEO entrenchment and weakens the monitoring and disciplinary controls of the board, hence lowering the likelihood of 
CEO turnover. Thus, the study predicted a negative association between managerial ownership and CEO turnover. 
However, the result of the regression as shown in Table 6 did not support the hypothesis. This finding contrasts with the 
previous empirical studies reported by Hornstein (2013) that, the higher the level of managerial ownership in a firm, the 
lower the probability of CEO turnover. A similar finding was documented by Ruan and Tian (2011) that, at a higher 
level of managerial ownership, the CEOs become entrenched and are not likely to be replaced in the events of poor 
performance. The difference in the outcome of this study with the previous studies might have been due to the low 
proportion of managerial ownership in the Nigerian corporate market which is dominated by a high concentration of 
blockholders and foreign ownership (Sanda et al., 2010; Tsegba et al., 2014). 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation  
This study found that corporate performance, board structure (board members’ gender diversity and board nominating 
committee independence), and foreign ownership influenced the CEO turnover in the Nigeria PLCs. For instance, 
boards with a substantial percentage of female directors are not likely to change their CEOs. Likewise, foreign 
ownership dominated firms have a high probability of CEO turnover. 
Therefore, this study recommends that the Nigerian government should enact a legislation on gender quota or 
affirmative law to ensure that a significant percentage of females are appointed to the boards of corporations. 
Furthermore, there is a need for the government through its regulatory agencies like NSE and CAC to encourage more 
foreign ownership as it serves as a strong governance mechanism in ensuring good and healthy corporate practices. In 
the same vein, the regulators should discourage managerial ownership in the firms as it has the tendency to weaken the 
effective monitoring and governance of the corporation. Hence, there is a need to review the NCCG to accommodate 
good reforms to enhance good corporate practices and the regulatory agencies to ensure compliance for a better 
corporate environment. 
There are some factors that might pose as limitations to the level of usefulness of the findings of this study. Firstly, this 
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study utilised only data on the non-financial sector of the NSE, hence, the results might not be generalised to all the 
registered companies in Nigeria. Moreover, the study utilised two variables for ownership structure, namely; foreign, 
and managerial ownership. It is quite possible that other ownership variables like family ownership, which was not 
included in this model may yield a more robust finding.  
Finally, it is believed that this study has no doubt contributed to the body of knowledge, especially in addressing the 
dearth of empirical literature on corporate governance in general, and specifically, on the CEO turnover in the emerging 
economies. Moreover, it is hoped that this study serves as a source of guidance to those responsible for hiring and firing 
CEOs and the regulatory authorities on the formulation, and enforcement of good corporate practices, that enhance the 
overall corporate governance practices in Nigeria.  
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